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Disestablishing Deism: Advocating Free Exercise 
Challenges to State-Induced Invocations of God 
Michael Blank  
One is often told that it is a very wrong thing to attack religion, 
because it makes men virtuous. So I am told; I have not 
noticed it. 
. . . .  
You find as you look around the world that every single bit of 
progress in humane feeling . . . every moral progress that there 
has been in the world has been consistently opposed by the 
organized churches of the world.
1
   
 My own view on religion is that of Lucretius. I regard it as 
a disease born of fear and as a source of untold misery to the 
human race.
2
 
—Bertrand Russell 
 
  J.D. (2009), Washington University School of Law; B.A., History (2006), Columbia 
University; B.A., Talmud and Rabbinics (2006), Jewish Theological Seminary of America. 
Special thanks to my parents, Alan Blank and Ellyn Sternfield, for their love, support, and 
advice. Thank you also to Professor Denise Z. Field for lending her editing and writing 
expertise, and to my friends Kevin Moore and Caldwell Collins for their input and 
encouragement. Additional thanks to the staff of the Washington University Journal of Law and 
Policy for their hard work. Specifically, I owe a great deal to the editors who worked on this 
Note, including Michelle Feit, Patrick Thornton, Sophie Wang, Stephen Winter, and Editor-in-
Chief Joel Christensen. Finally, I owe a great deal to Beth Simon, whose skills with a red pen 
and dedication during the writing process made this Note possible.  
 1. BERTRAND RUSSELL, WHY I AM NOT A CHRISTIAN, AND OTHER ESSAYS ON RELIGION 
AND RELATED SUBJECTS 19–21, 24 (Paul Edwards ed., 1st ed. 1957). 
 2. Id. at 24. 
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In recent years, Atheism
3
 has risen to a new level of visibility in 
American public life.
4
 This public awareness arose largely from an 
influx of what has been termed neo-Atheist, or new Atheist, 
literature,
5
 a phenomenon exemplified by authors like Sam Harris,
6
 
Richard Dawkins,
7
 and Christopher Hitchens.
8
 These Atheist authors 
 
 3. ―Atheism‖ generally refers to a philosophical belief in the non-existence of any god or 
gods. See WEBSTER‘S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY UNABRIDGED 137 (Philip 
Babcock Gove ed., Merriam-Webster 1993) (defining Atheism as ―disbelief in the existence of 
God or any other deity‖). It must be distinguished from agnosticism, which is the belief that the 
existence of god is unknown or unknowable. Id. at 42 (defining agnosticism as ―the doctrine 
that the existence or nature of any ultimate reality is unknown and probably unknowable or that 
any knowledge about matters of ultimate concern is impossible or improbable,‖ specifically 
knowledge of god). Many Atheists subscribe to ―religious‖ schemas such as Secular 
Humanism, which provide a discrete statement of beliefs and values. Secular Humanism has 
been described as an ―ethical, scientific, and philosophical outlook that has changed the world.‖ 
PAUL KURTZ, HUMANIST MANIFESTO 2000: A CALL FOR A NEW PLANETARY HUMANISM 
(2000), available at http://www.secularhumanism.org/index.php?section=main&page= 
manifesto. Its tenets include a disbelief in god, a rejection of organized religion, a reliance on 
scientific naturalism, and a commitment to provide all people on Earth with basic human rights. 
Its goals and dogma are found in the Humanist Manifesto 2000. See id. In this Note, Atheism 
refers to the affirmative belief that there is no god, and that ultimate questions of morality and 
purpose can be answered using the scientific method. See RICHARD DAWKINS, THE GOD 
DELUSION 209–33 (2006); David van Biema, God vs. Science, TIME, Nov. 5, 2006, at 48, 53. 
Van Biema‘s article contains a debate between a prominent Atheist evolutionary biologist and a 
religious scientist who supports creationism. Van Biema, at 48–55. He quotes Dawkins as 
saying that the problem with religious scientists is that they claim god as an answer, whereas an 
Atheist scientist admits a lack of knowledge but vows to pursue scientific research. Id. at 53. 
 4. See, e.g., E.J. Dionne Jr., Op-Ed., Answers to the Atheists, WASH. POST, Apr. 6, 2007, 
at A21; Peter Steinfels, Books on Atheism Are Raising Hackles in Unlikely Places, N.Y. TIMES, 
Mar. 3, 2007, at B5.  
 5. New Atheism or neo-Atheism refers to the recent surge in Atheist literature, not 
necessarily to the novelty of any ideology espoused by that literature. See Michael Novak, 
Lonely Atheists of the Global Village, NAT‘L REV., Mar. 19, 2007, at 43 (critiquing three recent 
books by Atheists from the perspective of a religious apologist); James Wood, The Celestial 
Teapot, THE NEW REPUBLIC, Dec. 18, 2006, at 27 (criticizing the new Atheist genre from the 
perspective of an Atheist); van Biema, supra note 3, at 49.  
 6. See SAM HARRIS, LETTER TO A CHRISTIAN NATION (2006); see also SAM HARRIS, THE 
END OF FAITH (2004). Harris is completing a doctorate in neuroscience and holds a degree in 
philosophy from Stanford University. Sam Harris, About Sam Harris, http://www.samharris. 
org/site/about (last visited July 15, 2009). 
 7. See Dawkins, supra note 3; see also van Biema, supra note 3, at 49. Dawkins is an 
evolutionary biologist well known for his vocal opposition both to religion in general and, more 
specifically, creationism. Van Biema, supra note 3, at 49.  
 8. See CHRISTOPHER HITCHENS, GOD IS NOT GREAT (2007). Hitchens primarily is a 
political columnist and foreign correspondent, and makes regular submissions to The Atlantic 
Monthly, Slate, and Vanity Fair. The Christopher Hitchens Web, http://www.hitchensweb.com 
(last visited Aug. 20, 2009).  
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have experienced popular success
9
 in the face of an American society 
where religion continues to play an important role.
10
 Despite the 
visibility of Atheist literature, however, Atheists trying to rid the 
public sphere of reference to god have met with much resistance.
11
  
The popularity of Atheist literature contrasts sharply with the 
prevalence of god and religion in American public life. For example, 
candidates for political office frequently invoke god in their rhetoric 
and actively seek the so-called religious vote.
12
 Congress wrote god 
 
 9. Hitchens‘s, Dawkins‘s, and Harris‘s books all have appeared multiple weeks on The 
New York Times Best Sellers list. Hitchens‘s book sold in the top sixteen in hardcover 
nonfiction for twenty weeks. Best Sellers: The New York Times Book Review, N.Y. TIMES 
MAG., Sept. 30, 2009, at 26, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2007/09/30/books/bestseller/ 
0930besthardnonfiction.html. Dawkins‘s book spent thirty-two weeks in the top sixteen in 
hardcover nonfiction. Best Sellers: The New York Times Book Review, N.Y. TIMES MAG., May 
13, 2007, at 30, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2007/05/13/books/bestseller/0513 
besthardnonfiction.html. Harris‘s first book, THE END OF FAITH, supra note 6, gained 
popularity as a paperback and spent fourteen weeks in the top sixteen on that list. Paperback 
Best Sellers: The New York Times Book Review, N.Y. TIMES MAG., Mar. 19, 2006, at 28, 
available at http://www.nytimes.com/2006/03/19/books/bestseller/0319bestpapernonfiction. 
html. His second book, LETTER TO A CHRISTIAN NATION, supra note 6, spent six weeks in the 
top sixteen of the hardcover nonfiction category. Best Sellers: The New York Times Book 
Review, N.Y. TIMES MAG., Nov. 19, 2006, at 26, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2006/ 
11/19/books/bestseller/1119besthardnonfiction.html.  
 10. A recent survey by the Pew Forum on Religion and Public Life found that Americans 
are more supportive of religion in public life now than they were in the 1960s, and that religious 
institutions are more involved with politics today than they used to be. The survey also noted 
the increasing involvement of evangelical Christians with conservative political attitudes. See 
PEW FORUM ON RELIGION & PUBLIC LIFE, MANY AMERICANS UNEASY WITH MIX OF RELIGION 
AND POLITICS 2–3 (2006), http://pewforum.org/publications/surveys/religion-politics-06.pdf.  
 11. For instance, following the Ninth Circuit‘s initial decision in Newdow v. U.S. 
Congress, 292 F.3d 597 (9th Cir. 2002), amended by 328 F.3d 466 (9th Cir. 2003), rev‟d Sub 
nom. Elk Grove Unified School District v. Newdow, 542 U.S. 1 (2004), members of both houses 
of Congress from both parties objected vociferously to the ruling, which declared the words 
―under god‖ in the Pledge of Allegiance to be unconstitutional. Many of them protested by 
gathering on the steps of the Capitol building to recite the Pledge, while the Senate voted 
unanimously to allow Senate legal counsel to intervene in the lawsuit. See CNN.com, 
Lawmakers blast Pledge ruling, June 27, 2002, http://archives.cnn.com/2002/LAW/06/26/ 
pledge.allegiance/.  
 12. See, e.g., CHRIS HEDGES, AMERICAN FASCISTS: THE CHRISTIAN RIGHT AND THE WAR 
ON AMERICA (2006) (comparing the religious right to twentieth-century totalitarian movements 
and decrying democratic society‘s tolerance for intolerant movements); Jason Carter, Toward a 
Genuine Debate About Morals, Religion, Politics, and Law: Why America Needs a Christian 
Response to the “Christian” Right, 41 GA. L. REV. 69 (2007) (arguing that the religious right 
and the secular left provide a false choice about the place of religion in American politics and 
advocating for a third, more moderate religious option); L. Scott Smith, Religion, Politics, and 
the Establishment Clause: Does God Belong in American Public Life?, 10 CHAP. L. REV. 299 
(2006) (reviewing the history of religion in American culture and arguing that historical 
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into the Internal Revenue Code, giving tax breaks to individuals who 
donate money to religious charities
13
 and exempting ―ministers of the 
gospel‖ from some taxes on income from their property.14 Indeed, 
god can be found on every dollar bill and every coin that comes out 
of the United States Mint.
15
 The Supreme Court even declared that 
the United States is a ―Christian nation,‖16 and more recently held 
that churches can use Schedule I narcotics
17
 for their religious 
ceremonies, while terminally ill cancer patients cannot use drugs 
from the same schedule to alleviate their symptoms without fear of 
federal prosecution.
18
 Several states have carved out exceptions to 
their criminal codes for parents who deny medical treatment to their 
 
evidence provides no answer as to whether the Establishment Clause is meant to impose a 
secular state). Former Senator Elizabeth Dole of North Carolina attempted to attack her 
opponent, Senator Kay Hagan, for taking money from a political action committee funded by 
Atheists during the 2008 election. Dole‘s attack ad, which featured Hagan‘s picture along with 
another woman‘s voice saying ―there is no god,‖ was widely considered to be a crucial element 
of her defeat in the 2008 election. See Gail Collins, Op-Ed, Thinking of Good Vibrations, N.Y. 
TIMES, Nov. 6, 2008, at A33.  
 13. 26 U.S.C. §§ 170(c)(2)(B), 501(c)(3) (2006).  
 14. 26 U.S.C. § 107 (2006).  
 15. The motto has been in continuous use on all United States currency since 1938. See 
U.S. Treasury, Fact Sheet on The History of ―In God We Trust,‖ http://www.treas.gov/ 
education/fact-sheets/currency/in-god-we-trust.shtml (last visited Aug. 20, 2009). Famous 
Atheist Madalyn Murray O‘Hair once challenged the motto on Establishment Clause grounds, 
but the suit was dismissed in Texas District Court. See O‘Hair v. Blumenthal, 462 F. Supp. 19 
(W.D. Tex. 1978) (holding that use of ―In God We Trust‖ as national model has secular 
purpose, has a primary effect that does not advance nor inhibit religion, and avoids excessive 
government entanglement with religion, and therefore does not violate the Establishment 
Clause).  
 16. Holy Trinity Church v. United States, 143 U.S. 457, 471 (1892) (holding that a law 
preventing corporations from contracting with foreign workers did not apply to a church 
contracting to bring a British pastor over to the United States). The Court lists a variety of state-
supported invocations of god as evidence of the United States being a Christian nation, 
including the traditional form of witnesses‘ oaths and oaths of office, legislative prayer, and the 
plentitude of churches in America. Id. 
 17. Drugs are classified into schedules according to the Controlled Substances Act, 21 
U.S.C. § 812 (2006). Schedule I substances have high potential for abuse and no medically 
accepted use. Id. 
 18. See Dawkins, supra note 3, at 22. Compare Gonzales v. O Centro Espirita 
Beneficiente Uniao do Vegetal, 546 U.S. 418, 439 (2006) (holding that the government failed to 
carry its burden in showing a compelling interest to bar the use of hoasca tea, which contains a 
schedule I substance, in religious ceremonies), with Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1 (2005) 
(holding that the application of provisions of the Controlled Substances Act criminalizing 
manufacture, distribution, or possession of marijuana to intrastate growers and users of medical 
marijuana approved by state law did not violate Commerce Clause).  
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children on religious grounds, leaving behind a generation of martyrs 
to the religious cause.
19
  
This privileged status of religion in America leads to some 
frustration amongst Atheists who have tried and failed to prevent the 
state from invoking god. In March 2000, Atheist Michael Newdow 
filed a lawsuit claiming that the words ―under God‖ in the Pledge of 
Allegiance violated the Establishment Clause.
20
 In June 2004, the 
Supreme Court dismissed his case for lack of standing.
21
 While 
Newdow‘s suit was pending, North Carolina District Court Judge 
James M. Honeycutt informed state officials that he no longer would 
allow the words ―so help me God‖ to be included in witnesses‘ 
oaths,
22
 nor would he allow the court clerk to open the court‘s day 
with the normal proclamation invoking god.
23
 In a perfunctory 
opinion, the North Carolina Supreme Court ordered Honeycutt to 
permit the invocation of god.
24
 
In both of these cases, citizens argued that a government-
mandated invocation of god violated the Establishment Clause.
25
 This 
Note will suggest that Atheists should challenge state-induced 
invocations of god under the Free Exercise Clause.
26
 Because of the 
 
 19. MARCI A. HAMILTON, GOD VS. THE GAVEL: RELIGION AND THE RULE OF LAW 31–39 
(2007). As Hamilton notes, states were required to enact exemptions permitting the medical 
neglect of children for religious reasons in order to qualify for federal funding related to 
children from 1974 to 1983. Id. at 31. ―[R]oughly 30 states plus the District of Columbia now 
have exemptions for religious parents from the medical neglect laws.‖ Id.  
 20. Newdow v. U.S. Congress, 292 F.3d 597 (9th Cir. 2002), amended by 328 F.3d 466 
(9th Cir. 2003), rev‟d sub nom. Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 542 U.S. 1 (2004). 
See also U.S. CONST. amend. I (―Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of 
religion . . . .‖).  
 21. Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 542 U.S. 1 (2004) (holding that a non-
custodial parent deprived by state law of the right to sue as next friend lacks prudential standing 
to bring an Establishment Clause challenge on behalf of his daughter).  
 22. Associated Press, N.C. Judge Requests Religion-Neutral Oaths, Courtrooms, FIRST 
AMENDMENT CENTER, Mar. 5, 2004, http://www.firstamendmentcenter.org/news.aspx?id= 
12871. The statute provides for an oath in the form of a ―most solemn appeal [] to Almighty 
God.‖ N.C. GEN. STAT. § 11-1 (2007). The state‘s evidence code, however, allows for either an 
oath or an affirmation of no specified form. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 8C-1, Rule 603 (2007). 
 23. In re Honeycutt, 600 S.E.2d 470 (N.C. 2004) (ordering Judge James M. Honeycutt ―to 
permit court to be opened with a proclamation which shall include the customary phrase, ‗God 
save the state and this honorable court.‘‖). 
 24. Id. 
 25. U.S. CONST. amend. I (―Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of 
religion . . . .‖). 
 26. Id. (―Congress shall make no law . . . prohibiting the Free Exercise [of religion]‖). 
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difference in doctrine, Free Exercise challenges may succeed where 
Establishment Clause challenges have failed. More specifically, this 
Note will examine four instances of so-called ceremonial deism:
27
 the 
Pledge of Allegiance, legislative prayer, oaths of office, and oaths of 
witnesses.  
Section A of Part I examines the evolution of the definition of 
religion and asserts that Atheism is a religion for First Amendment 
purposes. Section B of Part I discusses Establishment Clause 
jurisprudence, while Section C details how that doctrine has failed or 
would fail in challenges to state-induced invocations of god, 
highlighting the four examples of ceremonial deism aforementioned. 
Section D of Part I reviews Free Exercise Clause jurisprudence, and 
Part II outlines how Free Exercise challenges stand to succeed where 
Establishment Clause challenges to the Pledge of Allegiance, 
legislative prayer, oaths of office, and oaths of witnesses, have failed 
or would fail if attempted. This Note concludes by proposing that 
Atheists pursue Free Exercise challenges to state-induced invocations 
of god. 
I. HISTORY 
A. Evolution of a Definition of Religion 
The definition of religion for purposes of First Amendment 
protection evolved over time through the legal system.
28
 Surprisingly, 
the Supreme Court did not address the definition of religion until 
Reynolds v. United States in 1878.
29
 The Court stated that ―[t]he word 
 
 27. Justice Brennan attributed this term to former Dean of Yale Law School Eugene 
Rostow, who first used it in a lecture on Alexander Meiklejohn. Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 
668, 716 n.24 (1983) (Brennan, J., dissenting). Justice Brennan appropriated it to describe the 
national motto of ―In God We Trust‖ and the Pledge of Allegiance. Id. at 716–17. Justice 
O‘Connor used the term to describe similar instances of state-induced invocations of god for 
ceremonial purposes, like the Pledge. Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 542 U.S. 1, 44 
(2004) (O‘Connor, J., concurring). 
 28. See generally Derek H. Davis, Is Atheism a Religion? Recent Judicial Perspectives on 
the Constitutional Meaning of ―Religion,‖ 47 J. CHURCH & ST. 707 (2005) (describing the 
major cases establishing Atheism as a religion for purposes of First Amendment protection); 
Note, Toward a Constitutional Definition of Religion, 91 HARV. L. REV. 1056 (1978) (arguing 
for a broad functional definition of religion focusing on the ―ultimate concern‖ test). 
 29. Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145 (1878), in which the Court held that the 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol31/iss1/8
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‗religion‘ is not defined in the Constitution. We must go elsewhere, 
therefore, to ascertain its meaning. . . .‖30 The Court looked to 
history
31
 to discern the framers‘ vision of the beliefs to be protected 
under the religion clauses, and concluded that a traditional belief in 
god and morality must be involved.
32
  
The Court clarified its stance twelve years later in Davis v. 
Beason, when it stated that ―[t]he term ‗religion‘ has reference to 
one's views of his relations to his Creator, and to the obligations they 
impose of reverence for his being and character, and of obedience to 
his will.‖33 This substantive definition involving a traditional belief in 
god and the duties imposed by him lasted through the 1930s.
34
 
In the 1940s, a significant shift occurred wherein courts began 
looking for a functional definition of religion.
35
 In United States v. 
Ballard, the Supreme Court distinguished between the objective truth 
or verity of belief, which the Court deemed irrelevant to the belief‘s 
classification as a religion, and the good faith with which one holds 
belief, which the Court regarded as a relevant consideration.
36
 The 
Court made no attempt to define religion, but its holding illustrated 
that religion must encompass a broad range of beliefs.
37
  
 
conviction of a Mormon for bigamy did not violate the Free Exercise Clause. See id. at 168.  
 30. Id. at 162.  
 31. The Court relies mainly on public comments by James Madison and Thomas Jefferson 
regarding a Virginia law that Jefferson wrote mandating religious freedom, as well as their 
letters during the Constitutional Convention. Id. at 163. 
 32. See id. at 162–64. The Court saw polygamy as inconsistent with the European 
tradition from which the founders‘ beliefs originated. Id. at 164. 
 33. Davis v. Beason, 133 U.S. 333, 342 (1890), abrogated by Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 
620 (1996) (holding that a law forbidding bigamists from voting did not violate the Free 
Exercise Clause, abrogated on equal protection grounds).  
 34. See United States v. Macintosh, 283 U.S. 605, 633 (1931), overruled by Girouard v. 
United States, 328 U.S. 61 (1946) (holding that a candidate for naturalization who refuses to 
take an oath of allegiance because his Christian beliefs prevent him from agreeing to take part 
in war properly was denied citizenship). In dissent, Chief Justice Hughes wrote that ―[t]he 
essence of religion is belief in a relation to God involving duties superior to those arising from 
any human relation.‖ Macintosh, 283 U.S. at 633–34 (Hughes, C.J., dissenting).  
 35. Davis, supra note 28, at 710.  
 36. United States v. Ballard, 322 U.S. 78, 86 (1944) (holding that a court may not submit 
the truth or verity of the defendant‘s beliefs to a jury).  
 37. But see Lafferty v. Cook, 949 F.2d 1546 (10th Cir. 1991) (holding that a defendant‘s 
sincerely held religious beliefs that included a personal revelation from god instructing him to 
kill two people, characterized by the majority as a paranoid delusion, rendered him incompetent 
to stand trial). Dissenting from Lafferty, Judge Brorby indicated that, by declaring the defendant 
incompetent because of his direct communications with god, the majority was imposing its own 
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The Second Circuit formulated a more functional definition of 
religion in United States v. Kauten.
38
 Kauten focused on religion as a 
relationship between man and his fellow men, rather than a 
relationship solely between man and god.
39
 However, other federal 
circuit courts maintained the old substantive definition.
40
  
In several tax-related decisions from the 1950s, lower courts 
applied the functional definition from Kauten to embrace Secular 
Humanism as a religion.
41
 In 1961, the Supreme Court followed suit, 
stating in Torcaso v. Watkins that First Amendment protection 
extended both to believers and non-believers in god.
42
 The Court 
rejected the older substantive definition of religion in two selective 
service cases later in the same decade.
43
 It modified the functional 
 
judgment about what is ―realistic‖ in terms of religious beliefs. Id. at 1566 (Brorby, J., 
dissenting). For a more in depth discussion of Lafferty, see JOHN KRAKAUER, UNDER THE 
BANNER OF HEAVEN: A STORY OF VIOLENT FAITH 291–311 (Anchor Books 2004). 
 38. United States v. Kauten, 133 F.2d 703 (2d Cir. 1943) (holding that an Atheist‘s 
convictions against a war did not rise to the level of religious objection, and therefore he could 
not invoke religious protection from appearing for selective service). 
 39. Id. at 708. Judge Hand distinguished between objection to a specific war and 
conscientious objection to all war: 
The former is usually a political objection, while the latter, we think, may justly be 
regarded as a response of the individual to an inward mentor, call it conscience or God, 
that is for many persons at the present time the equivalent of what has always been 
thought a religious impulse. 
Id. 
 40. Berman v. United States, 156 F.2d 377 (9th Cir. 1946) (holding that an Atheist‘s 
convictions against the war do not exclude him from selective service because the Selective 
Service Act excuses only those with religious beliefs that prevent them from serving). The 
Court held that the term ―religion‖ required a belief in a deity. Id. at 380–82. 
 41. Wash. Ethical Soc‘y v. District of Columbia, 249 F.2d 127 (D.C. Cir. 1957) (holding 
that a Humanist society is entitled to a District of Columbia tax exemption for religious 
institutions even though it does not profess a belief in god); Fellowship of Humanity v. County 
of Alameda, 315 P.2d 394 (Cal. Ct. App. 1957) (holding that a Secular Humanist organization 
was immune from state taxation because of a state law excluding property used for exclusively 
―religious‖ purposes). 
 42. Torcaso v. Watkins, 367 U.S. 488 (1961) (holding that the requirement of a 
declaration of a belief in the existence of god, as a test for office, invaded the freedom of belief 
and religion of the petitioner in violation of the First and Fourteenth Amendments). The Court 
listed several religions that do not profess a belief in god: ―Buddhism, Taoism, Ethical Culture, 
Secular Humanism and others.‖ Id. at 495 n.11.  
 43. United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163 (1965) (holding that a person could be given 
conscientious objector status even if he did not have a belief in a supreme being as required by 
statute as long as he has a sincere and meaningful belief that occupies a parallel place in his life 
to that filled by orthodox belief in god by someone who clearly qualifies for the exemption); 
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definition by holding that, to qualify as a religion, a belief system 
must deal with matters of ultimate concern.
44
 The Court adopted an 
approach that compared nontraditional beliefs with traditional ones, 
and identified religion by its common role in people‘s lives.45 
In Wisconsin v. Yoder, the Supreme Court retreated somewhat 
from its expansive functional definition of religion.
46
 The Court 
stated that the mere fact that one holds a belief in good faith is not 
sufficient to extend to the belief protection as a religion.
47
 The 
majority distinguished between philosophical and personal choices, 
on the one hand, and religious compulsions, on the other.
48
 The Court 
accepted that the Amish lifestyle was a religious compulsion that 
triggered First Amendment protection,
49
 but it emphasized that 
beliefs must meet distinct criteria in order to qualify as a religion.
50
  
Since Yoder, some courts have retreated further from the Supreme 
Court‘s once expansive definition of religion. The Third Circuit, for 
 
Welsh v. United States, 398 U.S. 333 (1970) (holding that if an individual deeply and sincerely 
holds beliefs which are purely ethical or moral in source and content, but which nevertheless 
impose upon him duty of conscience to refrain from participating in all wars, such individual is 
entitled to conscientious objector exemption even if he does not profess a belief in god). 
 44. Seeger, 380 U.S. at 187. The Court relied on a quote from Christian philosopher Paul 
Tillich, who argues that belief in god is universal because one can replace the word god with 
any word that describes ―the depths of your life, . . . the source of your being, or your ultimate 
concern.‖ Id. 
 45. Welsh, 398 U.S. at 340 (―If an individual deeply and sincerely holds beliefs that are 
purely ethical or moral in source and content but that nevertheless impose upon him a duty of 
conscience . . . those beliefs certainly occupy in the life of that individual ‗a place parallel to 
that filled by . . . God‘ in traditionally religious persons.‖). 
 46. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 215–16 (1972) (holding that the First and 
Fourteenth Amendments prevent states from compelling Amish parents to cause their children, 
who have graduated from eighth grade, to attend formal high school to age sixteen).  
 47. Id. at 215–16 (―Although a determination of what is a ‗religious‘ belief or practice 
entitled to constitutional protection may present a most delicate question, the very concept of 
ordered liberty precludes allowing every person to make his own standards on matters of 
conduct in which society as a whole has important interests.‖).  
 48. Id. at 216.  
[I]f the Amish asserted their claims because of their subjective evaluation and rejection 
of the contemporary secular values accepted by the majority, much as Thoreau rejected 
the social values of his time and isolated himself at Walden Pond, their claims would 
not rest on a religious basis. Thoreau‘s choice was philosophical and personal rather 
than religious, and such belief does not rise to the demands of the Religion Clauses.  
Id. 
 49. Id. 
 50. See id. at 215–17; see also Davis, supra note 28, at 715–16.  
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instance, developed three strict criteria for identifying a religion that 
restrict the Court‘s prior functional definition.51 To qualify for First 
Amendment protection according to the Third Circuit‘s test, a 
purported religion must deal with fundamental and ultimate questions 
regarding deep and imponderable matters,
52
 must be comprehensive 
in nature,
53
 and must have a formal set of exterior signs and practices 
analogous to traditional religions.
54
 Although many courts followed 
in adopting a definition of religion based on the fulfillment of 
required elements,
55
 this approach does not enjoy universal support 
among the circuits,
56
 some of which continue to apply the malleable 
definition articulated in the selective service cases from the late 
1960s and early 1970s.
57
  
 
 51. See Malnak v. Yogi, 592 F.2d 197, 207–10 (3d Cir. 1979) (Adams, J., concurring) 
(agreeing that a public school course teaching the ―science‖ of creationism and involving 
transcendental meditation violated the Establishment Clause); Africa v. Pennsylvania, 662 F.2d 
1025, 1032 (3d Cir. 1981) (utilizing the tripartite test from Malnak‟s concurrence and holding 
that a prisoner‘s ―revolutionary‖ beliefs did not qualify as a religion for purposes of First 
Amendment protection because they did not address fundamental and ultimate questions). In 
both cases, the court relied on the functional definition of religion provided by the Supreme 
Court as a basis for its more rigid three-part test. Malnak, 592 F.2d at 207; Africa, 662 F.2d at 
1031–32.  
 52. Malnak, 592 F.2d at 208; Africa, 662 F.2d at 1032–33. 
 53. Malnak, 592 F.2d at 209 (―A religion is not generally confined to one question or one 
moral teaching; it has a broader scope. It lays claim to an ultimate and comprehensive ‗truth.‘‖); 
Africa, 662 F.2d at 1032, 1035.  
 54. Malnak, 592 F.2d at 209–10; Africa, 662 F.2d at 1032, 1035–36. ―Such signs might 
include formal services, ceremonial functions, the existence of clergy, structure and 
organization, efforts at propagation, observance of holidays and other similar manifestations 
associated with the traditional religions.‖ Malnak, 592 F.2d at 209.  
 55. Several courts applying such a test use the Third Circuit‘s three-part test verbatim. 
See, e.g., Carpenter v. Wilkinson, 946 F. Supp. 522, 526–28 (N.D. Ohio 1996) (utilizing the 
three part test to analyze Satanism); Johnson v. Pa. Bureau of Corr., 661 F. Supp. 425, 436 
(W.D. Pa. 1987). Other courts, however, modify the Third Circuit‘s test slightly. See Jacques v. 
Hilton, 569 F. Supp. 730, 733–36 (D.N.J. 1983) (holding that prisoners‘ religious beliefs did 
not qualify for First Amendment protection as a religion because they: (1) did not adequately 
address the question of human mortality or the purpose of life; (2) lacked the cohesiveness and 
commonality of beliefs typical of accepted religions; and (3) lacked the defining structural 
characteristics of traditional religious institutions). 
 56. For example, the Seventh Circuit relies explicitly on the broad functional definition 
laid out in Torcaso. See Kaufman v. McCaughtry, 419 F.3d 678, 681–82 (7th Cir. 2005) 
(holding that, where prison officials allow prisoners to form religious groups, the denial of the 
right to form an Atheist group violates the Establishment Clause because Atheism qualifies as a 
religion for the purpose of First Amendment protection). Torcaso v. Watkins, 367 U.S. 488, 495 
(1961).  
 57. Seeger, 380 U.S. at 187; Welsh, 398 U.S. at 340. See also Torcaso, 367 U.S. at 495. 
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Applying either the Supreme Court‘s functional definition or the 
Third Circuit‘s three-part test,58 Atheists should prevail in arguing 
that Atheism qualifies as a religion for First Amendment purposes. 
Atheism occupies the same place in an Atheist‘s life as religion does 
for a religious person.
59
 It deals with the very nature of god,
60
 and 
informs all those aspects of life normally informed by religion like 
morality,
61
 theodicy,
62
 and the origin of life.
63
 While there is no one 
church or institution of Atheism,
64
 an Atheist‘s adherence to 
scientific method in all areas of life
65
 and rejection of the existence of 
any deity are distinguishable characteristics analogous to those of 
adherents to traditional religions. Surprising as this conclusion may 
seem, many courts, including the Supreme Court, have indicated their 
agreement.
66
 
 
 58. Supra notes 49–52 and accompanying text. 
 59. Among recent Atheist authors, Sam Harris is the most explicit about carving out a 
place for Atheist spirituality analogous to traditional religions. Specifically, he advocates a type 
of spiritual meditation that will emphasize happiness, consciousness, introspection, and the 
development of the self. See HARRIS, THE END OF FAITH, supra note 6, at 204–27.  
 60. See, e.g., DAWKINS, supra note 3, at 113–51. Dawkins also addresses traditional 
religious proofs for god‘s existence, illustrating a rational person‘s path toward Atheist beliefs. 
Id. at 77–105.  
 61. Id. at 209–26; see also HARRIS, THE END OF FAITH, supra note 6, at 170–203. Many 
religious people argue that there can be no morality without god, and Atheists must counter 
such arguments in order to solidify their Atheist beliefs.  
 62. Theodicy is the question of why bad things happen to good people. Atheism deals 
with this problem directly because the absence of god allows for nature‘s neutrality. Theodicy 
mainly is a question for religious philosophers who must deal with god‘s seeming indifference 
and unwillingness to act for the benefit of goodness. See DAWKINS, supra note 3, at 108.  
 63. Atheists generally are proponents of evolution, while many traditional religions 
promote creationism, or the idea that god created the world as it exists today over a given 
period of time. See generally van Biema, supra note 3.  
 64. Some Atheists have formed organizations more analogous to traditional religions in 
that there is a church or other place of worship and stated dogma. Most prominent among these 
is Secular Humanism. See discussion supra note 3. There also are other Atheist organizations 
that identify as ―churches,‖ like the Church of the Flying Spaghetti Monster, and the Temple of 
the Invisible Pink Unicorn. See Bobby Henderson, Church of the Flying Spaghetti Monster, 
http://www.venganza.org (last visited May 6, 2009); The Virtual-Temple of the Invisible Pink 
Unicorn, http://www.theinvisiblepinkunicorn.com (last visited Nov. 18, 2007). However, no 
one Atheist ―church‖ can claim universal approval or membership by Atheists.  
 65. Dawkins in particular equates Atheism with the use of scientific method to reveal the 
answer to any question one has about the world. See Dawkins, supra note 3, at 209–33.  
 66. Kaufman v. McCaughtry, 419 F.3d 678, 682 (7th Cir. 2005). In describing the 
constitutional freedom of religion, the court said:  
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B. Establishment Clause Jurisprudence 
Atheists in recent years have relied on the Establishment Clause 
of the First Amendment to challenge state-sponsored religiosity.
67
 
The beginnings of Establishment Clause jurisprudence relied on 
Thomas Jefferson‘s characterization of a ―wall of separation‖ 
between church and state.
68
 The deference shown to state actions in 
 
At one time it was thought that this right merely proscribed the preference of one 
Christian sect over another, but would not require equal respect for the conscience of 
the infidel, the atheist, or the adherent of a non-Christian faith such as Islam or 
Judaism. But when the underlying principle has been examined in the crucible of 
litigation, the Court has unambiguously concluded that the individual freedom of 
conscience protected by the First Amendment embraces the right to select any 
religious faith, or none at all. 
Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 52–53 (1985).   
 67. See, e.g., Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 542 U.S. 1 (2004); O‘Hair v. 
Blumenthal, 462 F. Supp. 19 (W.D. Tex. 1978); Abington Sch. Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 
(1963). This likely is due to the differing standing requirements for Free Exercise jurisprudence 
and Establishment Clause jurisprudence. Standing is a requirement stemming from the 
interpretation of the case or controversy requirement of Article III of The United States 
Constitution. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1. The Supreme Court has interpreted that clause to 
require that any litigant bringing suit in federal court must show that he or she has suffered a 
concrete and particularized injury, that the injury is fairly traceable to the wrongful conduct 
complained of, and that it is likely that a favorable decision will redress that injury. 
Massachusetts v. E.P.A., 549 U.S. 497, 517 (2007) (citing Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 
U.S. 555, 560–61 (1992)). The Court has carved out a narrow exception, however, for certain 
congressional actions that can be challenged by any taxpayer. Taxpayer standing is allowed in 
any case challenging a congressional action taken pursuant to the taxing or spending power that 
allegedly violates a discrete constitutional right. Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 103–06 (1968). 
The Flast exception appears to be limited to congressional actions (as opposed to executive 
actions) that violate the Establishment Clause (as opposed to other constitutional limitations, 
like the Commerce Clause). See Hein v. Freedom From Religion Found., 551 U.S. 587, 608 
(2007) (holding that Flast is limited to challenges to legislative enactments and therefore does 
not encompass taxpayer standing to challenge general appropriations by the Executive Branch); 
DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Cuno, 547 U.S. 332, 347–48 (2006) (noting ―that ‗only the 
Establishment Clause‘ has supported federal taxpayer suits since Flast‖). But despite any 
limitations on Flast, these cases make clear that standing for Establishment Clause challenges is 
much broader than standing for Free Exercise challenges. In the context of Free Exercise, only 
those members of a religion targeted by or unduly affected by a state action would experience 
the necessary injury to bring their claim. See Newdow, 542 U.S. at 11–12; Lujan, 504 U.S. at 
560–61.  
 68. See Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 15–17 (1947) (holding that the use of public 
buses for transporting students to and from private parochial schools does not violate the 
Establishment Clause). In Everson, The Court stated: 
The ‗establishment of religion‘ clause of the First Amendment means at least this: 
Neither a state nor the Federal Government can set up a church. Neither can pass laws 
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early cases, however, indicated that the Supreme Court would not be 
as strict as the ―wall of separation‖ standard implied.69  
In the mid-twentieth century, the Court identified two pillars of 
Establishment Clause jurisprudence: the neutrality principle and the 
coerciveness principle.
70
 The neutrality principle holds that the 
government need not be hostile toward religion, but it cannot show a 
preference for any one religion in particular.
71
 The coerciveness 
principle dictates that neither the purpose nor the effect of the 
government‘s action can be to coerce citizens into religious 
observances or rituals.
72
 
The Court added to the coerciveness and neutrality principles in 
Abington Township School District v. Schempp.
73
 There, the Court 
 
which aid one religion, aid all religions, or prefer one religion over another. Neither 
can force nor influence a person to go to or to remain away from church against his 
will or force him to profess a belief or disbelief in any religion. No person can be 
punished for entertaining or professing religious beliefs or disbeliefs, for church 
attendance or non-attendance. No tax in any amount, large or small, can be levied to 
support any religious activities or institutions, whatever they may be called, or 
whatever form they may adopt to teach or practice religion. Neither a state nor the 
Federal Government can, openly or secretly, participate in the affairs of any religious 
organizations or groups and vice versa. In the words of Jefferson, the clause against 
establishment of religion by law was intended to erect ‗a wall of separation‘ between 
Church and State.  
Id. at 15–16 (quoting Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 164 (1878). 
 69. Despite the harshness of its language, the Court in Everson upheld the New Jersey 
statute allowing for use of public buses to transport children to and from parochial schools. The 
Court suggested that if this statute were not allowed, then no public services could be provided 
to private parochial schools including police and fire protection, connections to the sewage 
system, or access to public highways. Id. at 17–18.  
 70. See Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 311–312 (1952) (holding that a state statute 
providing for a release time program for the release of public school children from school 
attendance to attend religious classes was constitutional); Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 430–32 
(1962) (holding that the New York Board of Regents program of daily classroom invocation of 
god‘s blessings in public schools was a ―religious activity,‖ and violated the Establishment 
Clause, though pupils were not required to participate). 
 71. Engel, 370 U.S. at 430–32 (discussing colonial experiences with the union of church 
and state); Everson, 330 U.S. at 15. 
 72. See Engel, 370 U.S. at 431 (―When the power, prestige and financial support of 
government is placed behind a particular religious belief, the indirect coercive pressure upon 
religious minorities to conform to the prevailing officially approved religion is plain.‖); Zorach, 
343 U.S. at 311; Everson, 330 U.S. at 15. 
 73. Sch. Dist. of Abington Twp. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963) (holding that a state‘s 
requirement that the school day be opened with a reading from the Bible violates the 
Establishment Clause).  
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identified two additional tests that a government action must meet to 
withstand an Establishment Clause challenge. The government‘s 
purpose in acting must be secular, and the primary effect of its action 
cannot be the advancement or inhibition of religion.
74
 Eight years 
later, in Lemon v. Kurtzman, the Court streamlined the requirements 
for government action under the Establishment Clause into a three-
part test, commonly referred to as the Lemon test.
75
 In addition to the 
secular purpose and primary effects requirements, the government‘s 
actions cannot result in the state‘s excessive entanglement with 
religion.
76
 Since Lemon, the Court has applied some mixture of the 
Lemon test and the coerciveness principle.
77
 
The role of Lemon in Establishment Clause jurisprudence was 
somewhat obscured by two cases from 2005 addressing displays of 
the Ten Commandments on public buildings in Texas and 
Kentucky.
78
 In the Texas case, Chief Justice Rehnquist stated that the 
criteria in the Lemon test provided nothing more than ―helpful 
signposts,‖79 though he focused on the secular purpose of the Texas 
 
 74. Id. at 222. 
 75. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612–13 (1971) (holding that a Rhode Island 
program providing for state funding of teachers in private parochial schools teaching secular 
subjects violates the Establishment Clause despite its secular purpose because it results in 
excessive entanglement of government and religion).  
 76. Id. 
 77. See Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 587 (1992) (holding that the inclusion of 
invocations and benedictions in the form of prayer at public school graduation ceremonies 
violates the Establishment Clause even when the prayer is non-sectarian); Wallace v. Jaffree, 
472 U.S. 38, 56 (1985) (holding that a state statute authorizing a daily period of silence in 
public schools for meditation or prayer violated the Establishment Clause). Justice O‘Connor in 
particular thought that the secular purpose prong of the Lemon test was conflatable with the 
coerciveness principle. See Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 687–89 (1984) (O‘Connor, J., 
concurring) (maintaining that a city‘s inclusion of a nativity scene in its Christmas display did 
not violate the Establishment Clause).  
 78. See Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677 (2005) (holding that, where historical evidence 
showed that the County‘s purpose was to acknowledge the historical role of religion in 
American life, the public display of the ten commandments in a courthouse did not violate the 
Establishment Clause); McCreary County, Ky. v. ACLU of Ky., 545 U.S. 844 (2005) (holding 
that, where historical evidence showed that the County‘s purpose was to promote a religious 
message, the public display of the ten commandments in a courthouse violated the 
Establishment Clause). 
 79. Van Orden, 545 U.S. at 686 (citing Hunt v. McNair, 413 U.S. 734, 741 (1973), in 
which the Court held that a South Carolina statute authorizing revenue bonds for aiding 
colleges but explicitly excepting religious institutions did not violate the Establishment Clause 
because it satisfied the Lemon test).  
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legislature in upholding the display.
80
 In contrast, Justice Souter 
relied explicitly on the secular purpose prong of the Lemon test to 
invalidate the Kentucky display.
81
  
C. Applying Establishment Clause Jurisprudence to Real and 
Potential Challenges to State Induced Invocations of God 
The most prominent subject of an Establishment Clause challenge 
to state-induced invocations of god is the Pledge of Allegiance. The 
Pledge was initially published in 1892, but has undergone many 
changes since then.
82
 Prior to the inclusion of any reference to god, 
the Supreme Court addressed objections to state-compelled recitation 
of the Pledge. After first holding that states could require students to 
recite the Pledge as part of compulsory flag salute in public schools,
83
 
the Supreme Court reversed itself only three years later.
84
 In West 
Virginia v. Barnette, the Court held that the state cannot compel 
public school students to recite the Pledge, basing its decision not on 
the religion clauses, but on the broader underpinnings of freedom of 
conscience enshrined in the First Amendment.
85
 It was not until 1954 
that Congress added the words ―under God‖ to the Pledge, resulting 
in the wording that persists today.
86
  
Despite the holding in Barnette, many states have patriotic 
exercise statutes mandating daily recitation of the Pledge by public 
school students.
87
 Often, these statutes allow for objecting students to 
 
 80. Id. at 688.  
 81. McCreary, 545 U.S. at 864–65.  
 82. Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 542 U.S. 1, 6–7 (2004).  
 83. Minersville Sch. Dist. v. Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586 (1940), overruled by W. Va. State Bd. 
of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943). Minersville upheld a state requirement that students 
attending public school take part in flag salute ceremonies. Id. 
 84. W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943) (holding that a state 
statute mandating flag salute by students in public school is unconstitutional).  
 85. Id. at 634–42.  
 86. Newdow, 542 U.S. at 7; see also 4 U.S.C. § 4 (2000).  
 87. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 16-43-5 (2001); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 15-506 (2002); CAL. 
EDUC. CODE § 52720 (West 2006) (allowing recitation of Pledge to satisfy mandatory ―patriotic 
exercise‖ requirement); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 14 § 4105 (2007); GA. CODE ANN. § 20-2-310 
(2005) (requiring that students be afforded an opportunity to recite the Pledge); 105 ILL. COMP. 
STAT. 5/27-3 (2006); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 72-5308 (2002); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 17:2115 
(2001 & Supp. 2009) (mandating that school boards allow opportunities for recitation of 
Pledge); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 71, § 69 (2006); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN § 389.040 (West 2006) 
Washington University Open Scholarship
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
172 Journal of Law & Policy [Vol. 31:157 
 
 
opt out of saying the Pledge.
88
 The combination of the reference to 
god and the proliferation of patriotic exercise statutes made an 
Establishment Clause challenge to the Pledge of Allegiance almost 
inevitable. 
In Elk Grove Unified School District v. Newdow,
89
 Atheist 
Michael Newdow challenged the constitutionality of California‘s 
patriotic exercise statute.
90
 While the majority dismissed the suit for 
lack of standing,
91
 Chief Justice Rehnquist‘s concurring opinion 
 
(requiring that time be set aside to recite Pledge); N.M. STAT. ANN § 22-5-4.5 (West 2003); 
N.Y. EDUC. LAW § 802 (McKinney 2000); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 13-24-17.2 (2004) (requiring 
that right to recite the Pledge not be infringed upon).  
 88. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 14.03.130 (2006); ARK. CODE ANN. § 6-16-108 (2007); 
COLO. REV. STAT. § 22-1-106 (2008); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 33-1602 (2008); IND. CODE ANN. 
§ 20-30-5-0.5 (West 2008); MD. CODE ANN., Educ. § 7-105 (LexisNexis 2008); MINN. STAT. 
ANN. § 121A.11 (West 2008); MISS. CODE ANN. § 37-13-6 (2007); MO. REV. STAT. § 171.021 
(2000 & Supp. 2006); MONT. CODE ANN. § 20-7-133 (2008); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 194:15-c 
(2008) (allowing students who choose not to recite the Pledge to stand or remain seated silently, 
but mandating respect for the rights of students who elect to participate); N.J. STAT. ANN. 
§ 18A:36-3 (1999) (requiring excepted students to show full respect to the flag while the Pledge 
is recited by standing at attention, boys removing all head coverings); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 115C-
47(29a) (2007); N.D. CENT. CODE § 15.1-19-03.1 (2003) (noting that students may not be 
required to recite the Pledge, to stand during the recitation of the Pledge, or to salute the 
American flag); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3313.602 (West 2005) (authorizing daily recitation 
but prohibiting the intimidation of students by other students or staff aimed at coercing 
recitation of the Pledge); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 70, § 24-106 (West 2005); OR. REV. STAT. 
ANN. § 339.875 (West 2003) (requiring students who choose not to participate to maintain a 
respectful silence); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 16-22-11 (2001); S.C. CODE ANN. § 59-1-455 (2004) 
(allowing any form of non-participation that does not materially infringe on the rights of 
others); TENN. CODE ANN. § 49-6-1001 (2004); TEX. EDUC. CODE ANN. § 25.082 (Vernon 
2006) (requiring written parental permission to be excused from recitation of the Pledge); UTAH 
CODE ANN. § 53A-13-101.6 (2006 & Supp. 2008) (same); VA. CODE ANN. § 22.1-202 (2006) 
(requiring non-participating students to stand or sit quietly and make no displays that disrupts or 
distracts others reciting the Pledge); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 28A.230.140 (2006) (requiring 
non-participating students to maintain a respectful silence); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 18-5-15b 
(LexisNexis 2008); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 118.06 (West 2004). Florida has a similar statute, which 
the Eleventh Circuit declared unconstitutional to the extent it required students to stand at 
attention during the Pledge. See Fla. Stat. Ann. § 1003.44(1) (West 2004); Frazier ex. rel 
Frazier v. Winn, 535 F.3d 1279 (11th Cir. 2008). Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 10-230 (2002); KY. 
REV. STAT. ANN. § 158.175 (LexisNexis 2006) (including a provision authorizing local school 
districts to allow recitation of the Lord‘s Prayer to help students learn about the importance of 
freedom of religion). Pennsylvania has a similar law, which was declared unconstitutional by 
the Third Circuit because it required written parental permission to be excused from Pledge 
recitation. See 24 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 7–771 (c)(1) (West Supp. 2009); Circle Schools v. 
Pappert, 381 F.3d 172 (3d Cir. 2004). 
 89. Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 542 U.S. 1, 8 (2004). 
 90. CAL. EDUC. CODE § 52720 (West 2006). 
 91. Newdow, 542 U.S. at 17–18. As a non-custodial parent, Newdow was precluded by 
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concluded that the Establishment Clause challenge would fail on the 
merits.
92
 After detailing the many references to god in the public 
sphere,
93
 the Chief Justice asserted that the words ―under God‖ are 
not a prayer, but merely a descriptive phrase recognizing the history 
of the nation.
94
 Justice O‘Connor, concurring separately, agreed that 
the Establishment Clause challenge should fail.
95
 Only Justice 
Thomas concluded that the Establishment Clause challenge would 
have succeeded, and he suggested overruling precedent to avoid such 
an outcome.
96
 
In addition to Newdow‘s high profile challenge to the Pledge, 
citizens have targeted other state-induced invocations of god as 
subjects of failed Establishment Clause challenges—or would have 
done so if the political climate were different. In Marsh v. Chambers, 
a state legislator challenged the practice of opening Nebraska 
legislative sessions with a prayer offered by a chaplain paid with 
public funds.
97
 The Supreme Court held that the practice did not 
violate the Establishment Clause,
98
 relying primarily on the long and 
uninterrupted history of opening federal legislative sessions with a 
 
state law from suing on behalf of his daughter as next friend. The Court thus concluded that he 
also lacked prudential standing to sue on her behalf in federal court. Id. 
 92. Id. at 31–32 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring). 
 93. The opinion lists several statements by presidents at their inaugurations or at 
appearances before Congress in which god is invoked, as well as the words ―In God We Trust‖ 
on currency and the Court Marshal‘s opening declaration before the Supreme Court. Id. at 26–
29.  
 94. Id. at 31. ―The phrase ‗under God‘ is in no sense a prayer . . . . Reciting the Pledge . . . 
is a patriotic exercise, not a religious one; participants promise fidelity to our flag and our 
Nation, not to any particular God, faith, or church.‖ Id.  
 95. Id. at 33–45 (O‘Connor, J., concurring). Justice O‘Connor noted that certain 
ceremonial invocations of god have always been allowed, and asserted that the Establishment 
Clause challenge should fail because of the absence of compulsory worship or prayer, the 
absence of any reference to a particular religion, and the de minimis character of the religious 
reference involved. Id.  
 96. Id. at 49 (Thomas, J., concurring). Justice Thomas noted that the Pledge involves an 
affirmation of god‘s existence, and violates the coercion principle as laid out in Lee v. Weisman, 
505 U.S. 577 (1992). Lee held that a Providence, Rhode Island, custom of allowing public high 
school and middle school principals to invite clergy to give non-denominational prayers at 
graduation ceremonies violated the Establishment Clause because it failed the Lemon test and 
violated the coerciveness principle. However, Justice Thomas argued that Lee was decided 
wrongly because, in his view, coercion should be limited to coercion by the government, not 
coercion by one‘s peers. Newdow, 542 U.S. at 49.  
 97. Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, 784–85 (1983).  
 98. Id. at 793–95. 
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prayer.
99
 Chief Justice Burger proclaimed for the majority that ―[t]o 
invoke Divine guidance on a public body entrusted with making the 
laws is not, in these circumstances, an ‗establishment‘ of religion or a 
step toward establishment; it is simply a tolerable acknowledgment of 
beliefs widely held among the people of this country.‖100 Notably, the 
Court did not apply the Lemon test.
101
 
Federal officers have not challenged the oath of office on 
Establishment Clause grounds, likely because of the anticipated 
political repercussions.
102
 The official oath of the President, as set 
forth in the Constitution, does not include a reference to a deity,
103
 
though all presidents have appended one and have sworn the oath on 
a Bible.
104
 This practice has even made its way into our pop 
culture.
105
 The oath for other federal officers, including congressmen 
and judges, formally includes the phrase ―so help me God.‖106 Justice 
 
 99. Id. at 786–90.  
Standing alone, historical patterns cannot justify contemporary violations of 
constitutional guarantees, but there is far more here than simply historical patterns. In 
this context, historical evidence sheds light not only on what the draftsmen intended 
the Establishment Clause to mean, but also on how they thought that Clause applied to 
the practice authorized by the First Congress—their actions reveal their intent.  
Id. at 790.  
 100. Id. at 792. The majority notes that a Presbyterian has been the clergyman offering the 
prayer for sixteen years and that his prayer is Judeo-Christian, but nonetheless concludes that 
the longstanding history of legislative prayer, dating back to the First Congress, shows that 
there is no real danger of an establishment of religion ―while this Court sits.‖ Id. at 795.  
 101. Id. at 783–95; see also Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971).  
 102. See PEW FORUM, supra note 10. While federal officers have not challenged the oath, a 
few Atheist citizens have challenged the inclusion of the words ―under God.‖ For instance, 
Michael Newdow, the same person who challenged the Pledge, also challenged the religious 
invocations at the 2005 inauguration of President George W. Bush. Newdow v. Bush, 355 F. 
Supp. 2d 265 (D.D.C. 2005). The district court‘s rejection of Newdow‘s request for an 
injunction against President Bush‘s inauguration ceremony did not deter Newdow from again 
challenging the religious rites at President Obama‘s 2009 inauguration. That challenge also 
expressly sought an injunction against Chief Justice Roberts to prevent him from prompting the 
President to say the words ―under God‖ in the oath. Newdow‘s request for an injunction was 
again denied, this time without an opinion. See Associated Press, US Judge Lets Obama Include 
„God‟ In Oath, THE LEGAL INTELLIGENCER, Jan. 16, 2009, http://www.law.com/jsp/pa/ 
PubArticlePA.jsp?id=1202427515840. 
 103. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1. 
 104. See Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 633–35 (1992) (Scalia, J., dissenting); THE LEGAL 
INTELLIGENCER, supra note 102. 
 105. See, e.g., The West Wing: Inauguration Part I (NBC television broadcast Feb. 5, 
2003). 
 106. 5 U.S.C. § 3331 (2006). 
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Scalia, dissenting in Lee v. Weisman, indicated that he would uphold 
this practice under the Lemon test.
107
  
Challenges to the oaths of witnesses also are uncommon. Federal 
courts do not have a specific form of the witness oath; instead, the 
Federal Rules of Evidence and the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 
allow each court to tailor the witness oath to the needs and beliefs of 
individual witnesses, and explicitly allow for affirmations where a 
witness is uncomfortable taking an oath.
108
 Most state rules track the 
language of the Federal Rules and allow for discretion in the 
formation of the oath.
109
 Many states have held that forcing a witness 
to take the traditional form of the oath instead of accepting an 
affirmation is reversible error.
110
 Yet, some states have specific forms 
for their oaths or utilize oaths with a religious connotation, and those 
instances may be problematic.
111
  
In 2004, North Carolina District Judge James M. Honeycutt 
notified state officials and his court officers that he would no longer 
allow reference to god in the Court‘s opening invocation or in the 
 
 107. See Lee, 505 U.S. at 633–35 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 108. See FED. R. CIV. P. 43(d); FED. R. CIV. P. 30(c) FED. R. EVID. 603. 
 109. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-2221(2003); IND. CODE ANN. § 34-45-1-2 
(West 1999); MO. REV. STAT. § 492.040 (2000); WASH. REV. CODE ANN.§ 5.28.030-060 (West 
1995); IDAHO R. EVID. 603.  
 110. See United States v. Ward, 989 F.2d 1015 (9th Cir. 1992) (holding that the district 
court‘s refusal to allow the defendant to swear a sufficient oath of his own creation prevented 
him from testifying on his own behalf and violated his Free Exercise rights); Ferguson v. 
Comm‘r, 921 F.2d 588 (5th Cir. 1991) (reinstating a tax court claim previously dismissed for 
failure to prosecute after the petitioner refused to swear an oath because of religious beliefs); 
Gordon v. Idaho, 778 F.2d 1397, 1398–99 (9th Cir. 1985) (holding that it was an abuse of 
discretion for a court to dismiss a civil rights claim for noncompliance with discovery orders 
after the petitioner refused to use the words ―swear‖ or ―affirm‖ in his oath); United States v. 
Looper, 419 F.2d 1405, 1407 (4th Cir. 1969) (holding it reversible error to refuse the testimony 
of a witness who would not take an oath ―to God‖); Wright v. State, 135 So. 636 (Ala. Ct. App. 
1931) (holding an otherwise valid dying declaration may not be excluded from evidence solely 
because the declarant was an Atheist). 
 111. See ALA. CODE § 12-21-136 (LexisNexis 2005) (allowing oath to be tailored to the 
―religious faith of the witness‖); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 90.605 (West 1999) (giving specific 
wording for the oath without reference to god); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 233 § 19 (2006) 
(allowing oath to be tailored to the declarant‘s faith if witness is not Christian); OR. REV. STAT. 
ANN. § 40.320 (West 2003) (providing alternate phrasings, including one that invokes god and 
another without reference to a deity); 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 5901 (West 2000) (providing 
a specific phrasing invoking god and requiring that oath to be taken with a hand on ―the Holy 
Bible‖). But cf. 225 PA. CODE § 603 (2009) (tracking language of FED. R. EVID. 603). 
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administration of oaths to witnesses.
112
 He threatened to have court 
officers arrested for contempt if they violated his order because of his 
belief that the practices violated the Establishment Clause.
113
 In 
response to a lawsuit instituted by the Judge‘s court officers, the 
North Carolina Supreme Court issued a perfunctory order compelling 
Judge Honeycutt to use the ―traditional oath‖ and to allow the bailiff 
to open court sessions with the phrase ―God save the state and this 
honorable court.‖114  
Three years after the Honeycutt controversy, a witness in another 
North Carolina case sued the state after a court refused to allow her to 
take the witness oath on a Quran in lieu of a Bible.
115
 Although no 
court addressed the merits of that suit,
116
 a decision allowing the 
challenge to proceed led to a reversal of the State‘s practice of 
mandating oaths on Bibles
117
 and to a proposed change in the State‘s 
law on oaths of witnesses.
118
 
D. Free Exercise Jurisprudence 
A Free Exercise approach to state-induced invocations of god 
would differ in many respects from the failed Establishment Clause 
challenges. Historically, Free Exercise jurisprudence focused on a 
 
 112. See Court Orders „God‟ Into Oath, WASH. POST, June 30, 2004, at A22. The state‘s 
Supreme Court ordered compliance. In re Honeycutt, 600 S.E.2d 470, 470 (N.C. 2004).  
 113. See court orders „God‟ Into Oath, supra note 112. News reports indicate that Judge 
Honeycutt‘s actions were prompted by the increasing number of non-Christians and people of 
diverse beliefs served by the court system. Id.; Associated Press, supra note 22. However, the 
Judge has since indicated that the news reports about his case misconstrued his intentions and 
the severity of his actions. E-mail from James Honeycutt, Special Judge of the North Carolina 
Superior Court, to author (Jan. 23, 2008, 07:43 CST) (on file with author). 
 114. Honeycutt, 600 S.E.2d at 470.  
 115. ACLU of N.C. v. North Carolina, 639 S.E.2d 136, 137–38 (N.C. Ct. App. 2007) 
(holding that a challenge to the state‘s practice of mandating oaths on a bible was unavoidable 
litigation and therefore justifiable under the Declaratory Judgment Act). 
 116. Id. The Court held that the petitioner was entitled to an interpretation of the statute, 
but it did not offer that interpretation nor did any court after it. Id. 
 117. Id.; see also e-mail from James Honeycutt, supra note 113. 
 118. Compare N.C. GEN. STAT. §11-2 (2007) with S.B. 88, 2007 Gen. Assemb. (N.C. 
2007), available at http://www.ncleg.net/Sessions/2007/Bills/Senate/HTML/S88v1.html. The 
proposed legislation still requires witnesses to swear on a holy book, either the Bible or any 
other text sacred to the person‘s religious faith. The legislation further provides that only Bibles 
need to be kept on hand and provided by the court, and that any other sacred text must either be 
donated or brought to court by the witness. Id.  
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distinction between belief and conduct: the government could enact 
religion-neutral statutes that burdened the conduct of religious 
people, but it could not regulate beliefs.
119
 In the 1960s, the Supreme 
Court took a new approach and applied strict scrutiny to government 
actions that burdened or classified based on religion.
120
 Accordingly, 
the government needed to prove that a statute was narrowly tailored 
to serve a compelling government interest.
121
 Strict scrutiny also 
applied to facially neutral statutes that in effect burdened religion.
122
 
In Employment Division v. Smith, the Court retreated from the 
strict scrutiny approach.
123
 Justice Scalia wrote that the Court‘s 
previous cases involved hybrid rights: situations in which a Free 
Exercise challenge was paired with some other constitutionally 
protected interest.
124
 Thus, the Court concluded that a Free Exercise 
 
 119. See Braunfield v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599 (1961) (holding a statute proscribing the sale 
of certain goods on Sundays did not violate the Free Exercise clause as applied to Orthodox 
Jews); Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940) (holding that a statute prohibiting the 
solicitation of money or services for religious or philanthropic causes was unconstitutional as 
applied to a group of Jehovah‘s Witnesses selling books door-to-door); Reynolds v. United 
States, 98 U.S. 145, 162 (1878). Braunfield also suggested a distinction between direct burdens 
on religion, which would be unconstitutional, and indirect burdens on religion, which would be 
constitutional. Braunfield, 366 U.S. at 606–08.  
 120. Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 403–04, 410 (1963) (holding a South Carolina law 
denying unemployment benefits to people who refused to work on Saturday because of 
religious convictions violated the Free Exercise clause and the Equal Protection clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment). 
 121. Id. at 403–04. 
 122. See Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 220–21 (1972).  
 123. Employment Div., Dep‘t of Human Res. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990) (upholding 
constitutionality of statute prohibiting use of peyote even though use of peyote was an integral 
part of Respondent‘s religious practice).  
 124. Id. at 881. Soon after Smith, Justice Souter criticized the hybrid rights approach to the 
application of strict scrutiny, writing that: 
[T]he distinction Smith draws strikes me as ultimately untenable. If a hybrid claim is 
simply one in which another constitutional right is implicated, then the hybrid 
exception would probably be so vast as to swallow the Smith rule, and, indeed, the 
hybrid exception would certainly cover the situation exemplified by Smith, since free 
speech and associational rights are certainly implicated in the peyote ritual. 
Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 567 (Souter, J., 
concurring). The hybrid rights distinction also has been criticized by several constitutional 
scholars. See HAMILTON, supra note 19, at 223. The Federal Circuit Courts of Appeal have split 
over whether the hybrid rights exception is part of Smith‘s holding or merely unworkable dicta. 
At least two circuits have rejected the hybrid rights distinction outright. See Leebaert v. 
Harrington, 332 F.3d 134, 143–44 (2d Cir. 2003) (stating that the court ―can think of no good 
reason for the standard of review to vary simply with the number of constitutional rights that 
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challenge alone would not trigger strict scrutiny.
125
 Justice Scalia 
distinguished laws that discriminated against religion from ―neutral, 
generally applicable laws‖ incidentally burdening religion.126 The 
former may merit strict scrutiny, while Justice Scalia emphasized that 
the latter did not unless paired with a hybrid right.
127
  
Congress responded to Smith by passing the Religious Freedom 
Restoration Act (―RFRA‖), attempting to force the Court to apply 
strict scrutiny in all religious freedom cases.
128
 In the first Free 
Exercise Clause case following the passage of RFRA, the Court 
indeed applied strict scrutiny,
129
 but did not do so out of obedience to 
the Act. Rather, the Court applied strict scrutiny only after 
concluding that the law was neither neutral nor generally 
applicable.
130
  
 
the plaintiff asserts have been violated‖); Kissinger v. Bd. of Trs., 5 F.3d 177, 180 (6th Cir. 
1993) (deeming the hybrid rights exception ―completely illogical‖). Other circuits have required 
the hybrid claim to be independently viable. See Henderson v. Kennedy, 253 F.3d 12, 19 (D.C. 
Cir. 2001) (rejecting the application of strict scrutiny because the plaintiff‘s free speech claim 
was not viable); Brown v. Hot, Sexy, & Safer Prods., Inc., 68 F.3d 525, 539 (1st Cir. 1995) 
(same). Other circuits require merely that the hybrid claim be colorable. See Axson-Flynn v. 
Johnson, 356 F.3d 1277, 1297 (10th Cir. 2004) (defining colorable as having ―a fair probability 
or likelihood, but not a certitude, of success on the merits‖ (quoting Miller v. Reed, 176 F.3d 
1202, 1207 (9th Cir. 1999)); San Jose Christian Coll. v. Morgan Hill, 360 F.3d 1024, 1032 (9th 
Cir. 2004) (same). Still other circuits have recognized the hybrid rights distinction but have not 
yet definitively articulated their approach. See Civil Liberties for Urban Believers v. Chicago, 
342 F.3d 752, 765 (7th Cir. 2003) (citing the First, Sixth, Ninth, and Tenth Circuits with 
approval); Cornerstone Bible Church v. Hastings, 948 F.2d 464, 473–74 (8th Cir. 1991) 
(ordering district court to consider the hybrid rights claim on remand without further 
instruction); Combs v. Homer-Center Sch. Dist., 540 F.3d 231, 247 (3d Cir. 2008) (rejecting a 
hybrid rights claim because it failed both the ―independently viable claim‖ and ―colorable‖ 
approaches without choosing between the two). Thus, the continued viability of the hybrid 
rights distinction is somewhat in question.  
 125. Employment Div., 494 U.S. at 881. Interestingly, the majority also refused to require a 
compelling state interest for the law, reasoning that Sherbert v. Verner could not be read to 
require an exception from universally applied state criminal law. Id. at 882–89.  
 126. Id. at 879–81. 
 127. Id.  
 128. Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993, 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb (2006).  
 129. Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520 (1993) 
(invalidating a local ordinance banning the ritual slaughter of animals because the ordinance 
was not neutral or of general applicability, and the asserted government interest did not justify 
the targeting of religious activity).  
 130. Id. at 531. Justice Kennedy stated that ―if the object of a law is to infringe upon or 
restrict practices because of their religious motivation, the law is not neutral . . . and it is invalid 
unless it is justified by a compelling interest and is narrowly tailored to advance that interest.‖ 
Id. at 533. In a separate opinion, Justice Kennedy relied on neutrality as defined in the equal 
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In 1997, the Court held that RFRA was unconstitutional as applied 
to state and local statutes.
131
 In Boerne v. Flores, Justice Kennedy 
reasoned that RFRA exceeded Congress‘s authority under section 
five of the Fourteenth Amendment.
132
 The Court did not indicate, 
however, what standard would apply to state legislation that burdened 
religious practice or classified based on religious affiliation. In 2006, 
however, the Court held that RFRA was constitutional as applied to 
actions by the federal government.
133
 When a federal statute is 
implicated, therefore, strict scrutiny still applies.
134
  
In response to Boerne, advocates for several religious 
organizations sought another avenue to impose strict scrutiny in state 
Free Exercise cases.
135
 On the federal level, these groups urged 
passage of the Religious Liberty Protection Act (―RLPA‖).136 
However, RLPA failed in Congress amid objections by secular 
groups contending that the Act suffered from the same overbreadth 
that rendered RFRA problematic.
137
 In response, Congress passed the 
Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000 
(―RLUIPA‖), which applied the terms of RFRA to the discrete areas 
of land use and prisons.
138
 Shortly thereafter, several state legislatures 
 
protection context, discerning the lawmaking body‘s intent through direct and circumstantial 
evidence such as ―the historical background of the decision under challenge, the specific series 
of events leading to the enactment or official policy in question, and the legislative or 
administrative history.‖ Id. at 540 (citing Vill. of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 
429 U.S. 252, 266–68 (1977)). In his separate opinion, Justice Kennedy concluded that the 
ordinances were enacted for the purpose of suppressing the practice of the Santeria religion. Id. 
 131. City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 536 (1997) (involving the denial of a permit 
for expansion to a church because of an ordinance regarding preservation of historical sites).  
 132. Id. at 532. 
 133. See Gonzales v. O Centro Espirita Beneficiente Uniao do Vegetal, 546 U.S. 418, 424 
(2006).  
 134. Id. at 430–31; see also 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb (2006) (codifying a strict scrutiny test).  
 135. HAMILTON, supra note 19, at 181. Hamilton credits specifically ―groups like the 
Rutherford Institute, which is run and funded by attorney John W. Whitehead.‖ Id.  
 136. Religious Liberty Protection Act of 1999, H.R. 1691, 106th Cong. (1999); Religious 
Liberty Protection Act of 2000, S. 2081, 106th Cong. (2000); see also HAMILTON, supra note 
19, at 181.  
 137. HAMILTON, supra note 19, at 181. Groups that objected included ―children‘s 
advocates, corrections officials, city planners, historical preservationists, and cities, among 
others.‖ Id.  
 138. Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000cc – 
2000cc-5 (2006). RLUIPA also has been the subject of widespread criticism. See generally 
HAMILTON, supra note 19, at 79–110, 150–69 (arguing that RLUIPA unfairly benefits religious 
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passed statutes of broader applicability that mirrored RFRA.
139
 In 
these states, therefore, strict scrutiny applies even to neutral, 
generally applicable statutes that burden the free exercise of religion. 
The appropriate standard to apply in states without their own RFRAs 
is less clear.  
II. ANALYSIS AND PROPOSAL: COMPARING THE ESTABLISHMENT 
CLAUSE APPROACH WITH THE FREE EXERCISE CLAUSE APPROACH 
Since Atheism is a religion for purposes of First Amendment 
protection, it follows that Atheists may assert Free Exercise rights 
when challenging state-induced invocations of god.
140
 Although 
Establishment Clause jurisprudence has failed to address certain 
instances of state-sponsored religiosity, Atheists could challenge 
these same actions on Free Exercise Clause grounds. Applying a Free 
Exercise analysis instead of Establishment Clause doctrine, Atheists 
could succeed where they have not previously.  
Establishment Clause doctrine currently consists of a combination 
of the Lemon test and the coerciveness principle.
141
 National and 
local legislative enactments ―must have a secular purpose,‖142 their 
primary effect must not be the advancement or inhibition of 
 
landowners to the detriment of their neighbors and prisoners to the detriment of the 
rehabilitative process).  
 139. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 41-1493.01 (2008); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 52-
571b (2005); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 761.03 (West 2005); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 73-402 (2006); 775 
ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 35/1 – 99 (2006); MO. REV. STAT. § 1.302 (2008); N.M. STAT. ANN. 
§ 28-22-3 (2008); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 51, §§ 251–58 (2008); 71 PA. STAT. ANN. §§ 2401–06 
(West 2008 & Supp. 2009); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 42-80.1-3 (2001); S.C. CODE ANN. § 1-32-40 
(2005); TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. §§ 110.001 – 110.012 (Vernon 2005); VA. CODE 
ANN. § 57-2.02(B) (2007). Many other states considered similar legislation. See Marci 
Hamilton, How Existing State Religious Freedom Restoration Acts May Be Used To Help 
Cover Up Clergy Child Abuse, And Why States Considering RFRAs Should Think Again, 
FINDLAW, Nov. 7, 2002, http://writ.news.findlaw.com/hamilton/20021107.html.  
 140. State-induced invocations of god force Atheists to violate their religious beliefs. See 
supra note 3. This concrete and particularized injury may create standing to challenge the state 
action under a Free Exercise Clause theory. Cf. Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 542 
U.S. 1, 11–12 (2004); Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560–61 (1992); supra note 
67 and accompanying text.  
 141. See Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612 (1971). See also Lee v. Weisman, 505 
U.S. 577, 584 (1992). 
 142. Lemon, 403 U.S. at 612. 
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religion,
143
 they must not result in ―excessive government 
entanglement with religion,‖144 and they must not coerce citizens into 
choosing one religious practice over any other.
145
  
Free Exercise doctrine, on the other hand, is in a state of flux. 
While federal actions that burden religion or classify on the basis of 
religious affiliation are subject to strict scrutiny under the RFRA,
146
 
the Supreme Court has not indicated the appropriate standard for state 
and local enactments.
147
 If the Free Exercise challenge implicates an 
additional protected right, then the Court‘s hybrid rights analysis 
indicates strict scrutiny is the appropriate standard.
148
 Strict scrutiny 
also is appropriate if the challenged government action is not neutral 
or generally applicable.
149
 Additionally, strict scrutiny may be applied 
in states with their own RFRAs.
150
 If the challenged action is neutral 
and generally applicable, does not involve a hybrid right, and does 
not arise in a state that mandates strict scrutiny for burdens on the 
free exercise of religion, then it would seem likely that the 
government would only have to prove a legitimate interest
151
 and 
satisfy the belief/conduct distinction from the Court‘s early Free 
Exercise Clause jurisprudence.
152
  
A closer look at Establishment Clause and Free Exercise Clause 
doctrine as applied to four instances of ceremonial deism
153
 illustrates 
 
 143. Id. 
 144. Id. at 613. 
 145. Lee, 505 U.S. at 587.  
 146. See Gonzales v. O Centro Espirita Beneficente Uniao do Vegetal, 546 U.S. 418, 424 
(2006); see also 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb (2006). 
 147. See Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997).  
 148. Employment Div., Dep‘t of Human Res. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 881 (1990). 
However, the hybrid rights distinction has not been universally accepted. See supra note 124 
and accompanying text.  
 149. Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 531 (1993) 
(finding that a law not neutral or generally applicable ―must be justified by a compelling 
governmental interest and must be narrowly tailored to advance that interest). 
 150. See discussion supra note 139; See also HAMILTON, supra note 139.  
 151. All legislative enactments must satisfy rational basis scrutiny—they must be rationally 
related to the achievement of a legitimate government interest. See Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 
398, 406 (1963). If the Court were unwilling to apply strict scrutiny, at the very least the 
challenged law would have to meet this test. Id. 
 152. See cases cited supra note 119. 
 153. Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 542 U.S. 1, 37 (2004) (O‘Connor, J., 
concurring); see also supra note 27 and accompanying text.  
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how Atheists can succeed in Free Exercise challenges where an 
Establishment Clause challenge is likely to fail. 
A. The Pledge of Allegiance 
While Justice Thomas‘s argument in Newdow that California‘s 
Pledge policy violates the coerciveness principle has merit,
154
 the 
majority of the Court appears unwilling to overturn patriotic exercise 
statutes on Establishment Clause grounds.
155
 Justice O‘Connor‘s 
concurrence in Newdow provided the doctrinal Establishment Clause 
analysis of a challenge to the Pledge of Allegiance.
156
 Justice 
O‘Connor argued that the phrase ―under God‖ served the dual secular 
purpose of recognizing the historical role of religion in the United 
States and solemnizing public occasions.
157
 Justice O‘Connor also 
noted that the primary purpose of the wording could not be 
advancement of religion,
158
 nor could the phrase be considered 
 
 154. Newdow, 542 U.S. at 46–47 (Thomas, J., concurring). In West Virginia State Board of 
Education v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943), the Court held that states cannot 
constitutionally compel students to salute the American flag. Many states have opted for 
patriotic exercise statutes that require public schools to give students the opportunity to say the 
Pledge, while allowing objecting students to abstain. See statutes cited supra note 88. School 
prayer cases, however, uniformly have held that even moments of silence qualify as coercive 
and are unconstitutional under the Establishment Clause. See Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 
430–33 (1962); Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 58–62 (1985). Thus, even an optional recitation 
of the Pledge should amount to coercion under existing precedent, because objecting students 
are forced to observe moments of silence while their peers invoke god on behalf of their 
country.  
 155. While the majority opinion did not reach the merits, all three concurring opinions in 
Newdow concluded that an Establishment Clause challenge to California‘s Pledge policy should 
fail. Newdow, 542 U.S. at 1.  
 156. Newdow, 542 U.S. at 33–45. Chief Justice Rehnquist concurred, arguing that the 
Establishment Clause challenge would fail on the merits. His argument is historical rather than 
doctrinal, however, and therefore is unhelpful in determining how the Pledge policy fits with 
Establishment Clause doctrine. Id. at 18, 25 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring).  
 157. Id. at 35–36. ―I believe that although these references speak in the language of 
religious belief, they are more properly understood as employing the idiom for essentially 
secular purposes. One such purpose is to commemorate the role of religion in our history.‖ Id. 
Justice O‘Connor also argued that ceremonial references to god serve the secular purposes of 
―solemnizing public occasions, expressing confidence in the future, and encouraging the 
recognition of what is worthy of appreciation in society.‖ Id. at 36. (quoting Lynch v. Donnelly, 
465 U.S. 668, 692–93 (1984) (O‘Connor, J., concurring)).  
 158. Id. at 42.  
The phrase ―under God,‖ conceived and added at a time when our national religious 
diversity was neither as robust nor as well recognized as it is now, represents a 
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excessive entanglement given the de minimis character of the 
religious reference.
159
 Finally, the absence of worship, prayer, or 
reference to any specific religion led Justice O‘Connor to conclude 
that recitation of the Pledge was not coercive.
160
 Justice Thomas, also 
concurring, disagreed with this portion of O‘Connor‘s argument.161 
He noted that the coerciveness principle could be read to encompass 
coercion by one‘s peers, not just coercion by the government.162 
Thomas agreed, however, with the conclusion that the Pledge is 
constitutional under the Establishment Clause.
163
  
A Free Exercise Clause challenge to the Pledge policy should 
begin by noting that mandating the invocation of god forces Atheists 
to violate their religious beliefs.
164
 The argument should then 
highlight the connection between religious objection to the Pledge 
and the right to free speech that is concurrently implicated.
165
 Under 
the hybrid rights analysis, patriotic exercise statutes would need to be 
supported by a compelling government interest, and be narrowly 
 
tolerable attempt to acknowledge religion and to invoke its solemnizing power without 
favoring any individual religious sect or belief system. 
 159. Id. at 42–43. The de minimis character of the religious reference was important to 
Justice O‘Connor for three reasons: it affirms that the reference is meant to acknowledge 
religion rather than endorse it, it makes it easier for participants to ―opt out‖ of language they 
find offensive without totally rejecting the ceremony, and it limits the government‘s ability to 
prefer one sect over another. Id. at 43. 
 160. Id. at 44. ―Any coercion that persuades an onlooker to participate in an act of 
ceremonial deism is inconsequential, as an Establishment Clause matter, because such acts are 
simply not religious in character . . . [T]he Constitution does not guarantee citizens a right 
entirely to avoid ideas with which they disagree.‖ Id. 
 161. Id. at 45–47 (Thomas, J., concurring) (―Adherence to Lee would require us to strike 
down the Pledge policy.‖). 
 162. Id. at 47 (identifying two types of coercion: the State‘s coercive power in forcing 
students to attend school, and the peer pressure created through the Pledge policy). 
 163. Id. at 54. Justice Thomas took a more radical approach, suggesting that traditional 
Establishment Clause doctrine misconstrues the purpose of the First Amendment. He would 
read the Establishment Clause as a federalism provision, protecting state religious 
establishments from national interference. Consequently, he would reject the notion that the 
Establishment Clause protects any kind of individual right. Id. at 50–51.  
 164. See supra note 3 and accompanying text.  
 165. W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 634–35 (1943). The majority 
reasoned that compelling flag salute was the equivalent of compelling agreement with a 
political ideology. The Court explicitly rejected the notion that the challenge to the flag salute 
depended in any way on the religious views of the petitioners, saying that religion may have 
been the impetus for litigation but that the question posed was one of the State‘s power to 
mandate ideology. Id. 
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tailored to achieve that interest.
166
 Alternatively, one could argue that 
the Pledge is not neutral, since it favors religions that believe in god 
over religions that do not.
167
 Since the patriotic exercise statutes are 
not neutral and implicate hybrid rights, strict scrutiny is triggered.
168
  
In Barnette, the Court established that states could not compel 
school children to salute the flag, in part because the state‘s interest 
in fostering patriotism did not outweigh the children‘s right to free 
speech.
169
 Given that the same interest underlies states‘ current 
patriotic exercise legislation, the balancing approach taken in 
Barnette indicates that the state‘s interest is not compelling enough to 
outweigh the Free Exercise rights of Atheist children who otherwise 
would be compelled to recite the Pledge.
170
 Since the Pledge fails to 
satisfy the ―compelling interest‖ prong of strict scrutiny analysis,171 
Atheists might succeed in a Free Exercise challenge to state patriotic 
exercise statutes that mandate recitation of the Pledge.
172
 
 
 166. Employment Div., Dep‘t of Human Res. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 881 (1990).  
 167. Indeed, despite Justice O‘Connor‘s assertion that the Pledge does not favor any one 
belief system over any other, the history of the Pledge appears to illustrate the opposite. 
Newdow, 542 U.S. at 42 (O‘Connor, J., concurring). The phrase ―under God‖ was inserted in 
1954, at the height of the Cold War, in direct opposition to the type of state-imposed Atheism 
espoused by the USSR. Id. at 6–7. Given Justice Kennedy‘s admonition (albeit in a separate 
opinion not part of the majority holding) in Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye v. City of Hialeah 
to look at a statute‘s neutrality by examining the historical context in which it was enacted, it 
seems clear that the Pledge was meant to declare the superiority of a belief in god over a non-
belief in god. Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 540 (1993) 
(writing separately). The Pledge is not neutral because it was enacted ―because of, not in spite 
of,‖ Atheist beliefs, making it subject to strict scrutiny. Id. at 540–41 (quoting Personnel 
Admin‘r of Mass. v. Feeny, 442 U.S. 256, 279 (1979)); see also supra note 130 and 
accompanying text. 
 168. Employment Division, 494 U.S. at 881; City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. at 533, 540.  
 169. Barnette, 319 U.S. at 638, 641–42. The Court noted that patriotism is an important 
state interest, but argued that compelling patriotism will only lead to more vigorous dissent and 
disunity. Id. at 641–42.  
 170. One aspect of a Free Exercise approach, somewhat illustrated by Newdow, is that in 
order to have standing, the challenger would have to be an Atheist student who is affected by 
the patriotic exercise statute. This is due to the injury prong of standing analysis. See Lujan v. 
Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560–61 (1992); Newdow, 542 U.S. at 11–12; see also 
supra note 67 and accompanying text. A parent‘s ability to sue on behalf of his or her child may 
be more limited by state law. See Newdow, 542 U.S. at 11–12.  
 171. Strict scrutiny requires both that a government action be supported by a compelling 
government interest and that it be narrowly tailored to achieve that interest. City of Hialeah, 508 
U.S. at 546.  
 172. See State Patriotic Exercise Statutes, cited supra notes 87 and 88. 
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B. Legislative Prayer 
While the Court has never fully addressed how legislative prayer 
would be considered under the Establishment Clause, its precedent 
indicates that such a challenge would fail. Application of the Lemon 
test and coerciveness principle to legislative prayer is difficult, 
largely because of the historical rather than doctrinal approach taken 
by the Court in Marsh v. Chambers.
173
 The majority suggested that 
the purpose of opening legislative sessions with prayer is to invoke 
divine guidance—hardly a secular goal.174 However, the Court‘s 
emphasis on the history of legislative prayer indicates that a secular 
purpose might be the recognition of the role religion played in the 
ideology of those who founded the United States.
175
 While legislative 
prayer should fail the primary effect and excessive entanglement 
prongs of the Lemon test, Marsh indicates that the Court would not 
invalidate the practice on either basis.
176
 The Court also rejected the 
idea that legislative prayer was coercive, reasoning that the 
Establishment Clause does not bar a state from acting simply because 
the action is in harmony with religious canons.
177
 Since legislative 
prayer seems to satisfy the Lemon test as well as the coerciveness 
principle, it likely would survive a challenge under the Establishment 
Clause.  
Like the Pledge policy, legislative prayer burdens the Free 
Exercise rights of Atheists by forcing an Atheist legislator to violate 
his religious beliefs.
178
 Legislative prayer also fits into a hybrid rights 
analysis, raising issues of free speech and procedural due process 
relating to the legislative process.
179
 Alternatively, legislative prayer 
 
 173. Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783 (1983). Neither the Lemon test nor the coerciveness 
principle are mentioned in the majority opinion, which relies solely on the history of legislative 
prayer to show that it is consistent with the Founder‘s view of the First Amendment. Id. 
 174. Id. at 790–92.  
 175. The Court emphasized that the Framers knew of and often participated in state run 
churches, and that many of them were legislators at the First Congress, which opened sessions 
with a prayer. Given the Framers‘ knowledge, the Court concluded that the Framers could not 
have thought legislative prayer would be barred under the First Amendment. Id. 
 176. Again, however, application of the Lemon test is difficult because of the historical 
analysis used by the Court in Marsh. Marsh, 463 U.S. 783; see also supra note 173.  
 177. Marsh, 463 U.S. at 792.  
 178. See supra note 3 and accompanying text.  
 179. Legislative prayer might affect the objecting legislator‘s Fourteenth Amendment 
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might not be neutral because it favors religions that believe in god 
over religions that do not.
180
 Thus, in a Free Exercise context, the 
state‘s actions must pass strict scrutiny.181  
While the invocation of god at the opening of legislative sessions 
is well rooted in history, replication of that tradition for its own sake 
cannot be a compelling state interest.
182
 As for the state‘s other 
asserted purpose, the Court has characterized the recognition of 
religion‘s role in history as ―tolerable.‖183 This statement seems to 
indicate that, while such a goal may be legitimate, it hardly qualifies 
as compelling. Thus, an Atheist legislator wishing to challenge the 
practice of legislative prayer likely would have more success using a 
Free Exercise challenge than he or she would using Establishment 
Clause jurisprudence.
184
  
 
procedural due process rights. The affected legislator could voice concern that a legislative 
process that proceeds under the guise of religious empowerment does not comport with a 
republican form of government, and that laws passed by a legislature under the influence of 
legislative prayer might be invalid because of improper legislative intent. See U.S. CONST. 
amend. XIV; Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 540–41 
(1993) (indicating a willingness to inquire into legislative intent to decide whether an enactment 
is valid under the Fourteenth Amendment). Additionally, if the challenge is to legislative prayer 
on the federal level, strict scrutiny applies without the need to establish hybrid rights or non-
neutrality. See Gonzales v. O Centro Espirita Beneficente Uniao do Vegetal, 546 U.S. 418, 
430–31 (2006); see also 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb (2006). 
 180. Legislative prayer is meant to invoke ―Divine guidance‖ on behalf of the democratic 
leaders. Marsh, 463 U.S. at 792. The Court‘s own language in Marsh describing how the 
institutions of the United States presuppose a ―Supreme Being‖ indicates a preference for 
believers over non-believers in legislative positions. Id. Legislative prayer attempts to buttress 
believers at the expense of non-believers because of (not just in spite of) their belief or lack 
thereof, and therefore it violates basic principles of neutrality. See City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. at 
533, 540 (1993) (―a law lacks facial neutrality if it refers to a religious practice without a 
secular meaning discernible‖); see also supra note 130 and accompanying text.  
 181. Because a challenge would implicate hybrid rights, strict scrutiny applies. See 
Employment Div., Dep‘t of Human Res. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 881 (1990). Strict scrutiny 
also is appropriate because legislative prayer is not neutral. See supra note 180 and 
accompanying text; City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. at 533, 540.  
 182. Marsh, 463 U.S. at 790 (―Standing alone, historical patterns cannot justify 
contemporary violations of constitutional guarantees.‖).  
 183. Id. at 792 (―[Legislative prayer] is simply a tolerable acknowledgement of beliefs 
widely held among people of this country.‖).  
 184. Standing to challenge legislative prayer on Free Exercise grounds would be limited to 
legislators whose religious beliefs were inconsistent with the prayer offered due to the ―injury 
in fact‖ prong of standing analysis. See Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560–61 
(1992); Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 542 U.S. 1, 11–12 (2004); see also supra 
note 67 and accompanying text. This test would be satisfied by any Atheist legislator, but the 
political climate is such that self-proclaimed Atheists rarely are elected to political office. See 
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C. Oaths of Office 
Oaths of Office have not been tested through Establishment 
Clause challenges, but application of Establishment Clause doctrine 
under the Lemon test and coerciveness principle likely would yield a 
result similar to that of Newdow or Marsh.
185
 Justice O‘Connor‘s 
concurrence in Newdow notes the secular purpose of solemnizing 
public ceremonies that can be achieved through the invocation of 
god.
186
 The primary effect of the oath is to have officers swear to 
uphold their duties; they are not swearing an allegiance to god or any 
particular religion.
187
 Finally, the singular invocation of god at the 
end of the oath can hardly be described as excessive entanglement.
188
  
A Free Exercise challenge by an Atheist officer would have some 
chance of success. Strict scrutiny is applicable because of the special 
importance of the free speech rights of legislators.
189
 Additionally, 
the oath is arguably not neutral because it favors believers in a god 
over non-believers.
190
 While requiring officers to swear to uphold 
their duties is surely a compelling government interest,
191
 its 
application to Atheists taking office would fail to achieve that 
purpose. Officers who do not believe in god cannot possibly see the 
invocation of god as binding upon themselves in such a way that it 
 
PEW FORUM, supra note 10; HEDGES, supra note 12; Carter, supra note 12; Smith, supra note 
12.  
 185. Newdow, 542 U.S. at 1; Marsh, 463 U.S. at 783. Justice O‘Connor described oaths of 
office as being included in the same category of ceremonial deism as legislative prayer and the 
Pledge of Allegiance. See Newdow, 542 U.S. at 35–36 (O‘Connor, J., concurring); see also 5 
U.S.C. § 3331 (2006) (including in the oath for officers the phrase ―so help me God‖).  
 186. Newdow, 542 U.S. at 36 (O‘Connor, J., concurring).  
 187. Id. at 42.  
 188. Id. at 42–43. Just as the reference to god in the Pledge is considered to be de minimis, 
so too would the reference in the oath of office.  
 189. Beyond the ordinary protection of free speech found in the First Amendment, 
abridging both state and national legislators generally are vested with immunity for speech and 
debate in the course of their legislative duties. See U.S. CONST. amend. I; U.S. CONST. art. I, 
§ 6, cl. 1; see generally Steven F. Huefner, The Neglected Value of the Legislative Privilege in 
State Legislatures, 45 WM. & MARY L. REV. 221, 221 (2003) (arguing for a ―broad 
constitutional privilege for state legislators to protect the integrity of the deliberative process‖).  
 190. Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 532–33 (1993) 
(writing separately). The oath of officers favors believers in god over non-believers in god 
because of that belief or lack thereof. See id. at 540; see also supra notes 130 and 180 and 
accompanying text.  
 191. See Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 633 (1992) (Scalia, J., dissenting).  
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would cause them to be more diligent in fulfilling their 
responsibilities. Given the availability of religion-neutral alternatives, 
as is the case with the oaths for witnesses,
192
 a court should find that 
the state‘s action in mandating a religious form of the oath is not 
narrowly tailored to achieve its interest.
193
  
D. Oaths of Witnesses 
The permissive language of the Federal Rules of Evidence and 
Civil Procedure, and that of most state rules, likely mitigates any 
challenge to the oaths of witnesses on Establishment Clause 
grounds.
194
 Moreover, some courts have held that forcing a witness to 
take a traditional form of the oath over religious objection is 
reversible error.
195
 Nonetheless, a Free Exercise challenge might be 
successful when a court is confronted with a statute or state practice 
that demands a certain form of the oath, as is the case in North 
Carolina.
196
  
In both federal and state courts, a Free Exercise challenge to a 
witness oath would invoke strict scrutiny because of the due process 
rights implicated by witness testimony,
197
 and because an oath that 
 
 192. See FED. R. CIV. P. 43(d); FED. R. CIV. P. 30(C) 26; FED. R. EVID. 603; see also state 
statutes tracking this language supra note 109.  
 193. The consideration of religion-neutral alternatives is necessary to survive the narrow 
tailoring prong of strict scrutiny. While an exhaustion of neutral alternatives is not required, a 
complete lack of consideration, as has been the case in the context of oaths of office, will 
trigger a failure of strict scrutiny. See Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 339–40 (2003) (citing 
Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 509–10 (1989); Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 
476 U.S. 267, 280 n.6 (1986)) (upholding University of Michigan Law School‘s use of race in 
admissions policy).  
 194. See supra notes 109 and 192. 
 195. See, e.g., United States v. Ward, 989 F.2d 1015 (9th Cir. 1992); Ferguson v. Comm‘r, 
921 F.2d 588 (5th Cir. 1991); Gordon v. Idaho, 778 F.2d 1397 (9th Cir. 1985); United States v. 
Looper, 419 F.2d 1405, 1407 (4th Cir. 1969); Wright v. State, 135 So. 636 (Ala. Ct. App. 
1931).  
 196. See N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 11-1 to -2 (2007); see also In re Honeycutt, 600 S.E.2d 470 
(N.C. 2004); ACLU of North Carolina v. North Carolina, 639 S.E.2d 136 (N.C. Ct. App. 2007). 
More religiously intensive forms of the oath are required in several other states. See supra note 
109 and accompanying text.  
 197. See Ward, 989 F.2d at 1019 (noting that one‘s Fifth Amendment right to testify on 
one‘s own behalf is implicated when a criminal defendant is prevented from testifying because 
of his refusal to take a traditional oath); see also U.S. CONST. amend. V; U.S. CONST. amend. 
XIV, § 1. 
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mandates invocation of god is inherently non-neutral.
198
 While the 
government has a compelling interest in ensuring the truthfulness of 
witness testimony, both the availability of religion-neutral 
alternatives and the fact that such a goal would not be achieved in the 
case of an Atheist witness indicate that a court likely would look 
favorably on a Free Exercise challenge to witness oaths that mandate 
invocation of god.
199
 In North Carolina particularly, the statute 
dealing with witness oaths, even under the proposed revision, 
requires the oath to be sworn on a holy text.
200
 Many religions, 
including Atheism, have no such text, leaving the door open for 
future Free Exercise challenges.
201
  
CONCLUSION 
The Pledge of Allegiance, legislative prayer, oaths of office, and 
oaths of witnesses all represent instances in which states sponsor or 
require the invocation of god. Past and recent decisions by the 
Supreme Court indicate that challenges to these state actions under 
the Establishment Clause will fail.
202
 Without a current successful 
strategy, Atheists wishing to challenge the presence of god in the 
public sphere must look toward a different avenue. Confronted with a 
 
 198. Free Exercise challenges to federal statutes always implicate strict scrutiny. See 
Gonzales v. O Centro Espirita Beneficente Uniao do Vegetal, 546 U.S. 418, 430–31 (2006); see 
also 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb (2006). In state systems, challenges to witness oaths implicate the 
procedural rights of criminal defendants and civil parties, which in turn triggers hybrid rights 
analysis. See Employment Div. Dep‘t of Human Res. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 881 (1990) 
(discussing hybrid rights). Strict scrutiny is triggered because religiously involved witness oaths 
are not neutral. Requiring invocation of god in the oath of a witness favors believers over non-
believers in god because of that belief or lack thereof. Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye v. 
City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 533, 540 (1993); see also supra notes 130 and 180 and 
accompanying text.  
 199. An Atheist would not look upon the invocation of god or the swearing of an oath upon 
a bible as a way of solemnizing the occasion, and it would do nothing to invoke his or her 
conscience. Therefore, the rationale for the traditional oath fails when applied to an Atheist and 
could not be considered compelling. The availability of religion-neutral alternatives, moreover, 
indicates that the oath is not narrowly tailored to achieve the state‘s interest. See Grutter v. 
Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 339–40 (2003); see also supra note 193 and accompanying text.  
 200. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 11-2 (2007); S. 88, 2007 Gen. Assemb. (N.C. 2007), available 
at http://www.ncleg.net/Sessions/2007/Bills/Senate/HTML/S88v1.html. 
 201. See supra note 3.  
 202. See, e.g., Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 542 U.S. 1 (2004); Marsh v. 
Chambers, 463 U.S. 783 (1983); In re Honeycutt, 600 S.E.2d 470 (N.C. 2004).  
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system that favors religious interests, Atheists should find a way to 
turn that bias in their favor. By identifying Atheism as a religion, 
Atheists open the door to the use of the favorable strict scrutiny 
approach mandated by modern Free Exercise jurisprudence.
203
 
Because in each instance of ceremonial deism the state lacks either a 
compelling interest or a narrowly tailored approach, Free Exercise 
challenges should succeed where Establishment Clause jurisprudence 
has failed.
204
  
By its nature, Free Exercise jurisprudence demands that Atheists 
be more proactive in challenging state induced invocations of god.
205
 
Only those Atheists affected by the state‘s action will have standing 
to bring a challenge, meaning that Atheists participating in the 
political process must transcend societal pressures and advocate for 
their own cause.
206
 Though popular interest in Atheism is rising,
207
 
the political community remains hostile toward Atheists generally.
208
 
In a culture in which god and religion increasingly influence societal 
 
 203. In all federal cases, strict scrutiny applies to statutes challenged under the Free 
Exercise Clause. See Gonzales, 546 U.S. at 430–31; see also 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb. In most 
contexts, including the Pledge of Allegiance, oaths of office and of witnesses, and legislative 
prayer, a Free Exercise challenge implicates hybrid rights. See Smith, 494 U.S. at 881. 
Moreover, these instances of ceremonial deism favor belief in god over non-belief because of 
that belief or lack thereof, and their lack of neutrality triggers strict scrutiny. because of their 
non-neutrality. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. at 533, 540 (1993); see also supra notes 130 and 180 
and accompanying text. Thus, strict scrutiny applies even to challenges of state law.  
 204. In the context of the Pledge of Allegiance, the state‘s interest in fostering patriotism is 
not compelling according to the language of W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 
624, 641–42 (1943). With legislative prayer, oaths of office, and oaths of witnesses, the 
proffered state objective is not compelling when applied to Atheists, since invocation of god 
would not implicate the conscience or duty of an Atheist in the same way it would a religious 
person. See supra note 199 and accompanying text. 
 205. Because of standing requirements, the plaintiff in each of the challenges suggested by 
this Note must be a self-identified Atheist affected by the law. Therefore, only an Atheist 
legislator could challenge the practice of legislative prayer, and only an Atheist taking an oath 
of office could challenge that provision. This is because of the injury prong of standing 
analysis. See Newdow, 542 U.S. at 11–12; Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560–
61 (1992); see also supra note 67 and accompanying text. 
 206. Because of the preferred status of religion in political life, Atheists taking the kind of 
actions suggested by this note would likely be subject to immense political and social pressure 
not to disturb the status quo. See generally HEDGES, supra note 12; Carter, supra note 12; 
Smith supra note 12. 
 207. See generally supra note 4.  
 208. See generally HEDGES, supra note 12; Carter, supra note 12; Smith supra note 12. See 
also PEW FORUM, supra note 10. The advertisement run by Elizabeth Dole in the 2008 North 
Carolina senatorial race illustrates this hostility quite clearly. See Collins, supra note 12.  
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conduct and norms,
209
 Atheists must act to shore up the wall of 
separation between church and state
210
 by pursuing Free Exercise 
challenges to state-induced invocations of god.  
 
 209. See PEW FORUM, supra note 10. 
 210. Again, standing requirements mandate that Atheists take an active role in advocating 
for their own cause. See Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 542 U.S. at 11–12; Lujan, 
504 U.S. at 560–61; see also supra note 67 and accompanying text. The ―wall of separation‖ 
language is taken from Thomas Jefferson and is identified as one of the purposes of the 
Establishment Clause in Everson v. Bd. of Educ. of Ewing TP, 330 U.S. 1, 15–16 (1947) 
(quoting Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 164 (1878)). 
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